

1/24/17 8:44 AM

To do, on BNSP chapter

Added below: 1-29-17

(Note: in end, JFK decides against BNSP: SecDef Guidance

--(end-1962: McN gives up on war-fighting; McG B: he gave higher priority to ending B-70; than to fighting USAF on targeting

[like VIETNAM: McNamara doesn't interfere with Westy search and destroy; rather, tries to keep a lid on forces, and on RT (though, Tuesday luncheons, rejecting targets (see sensitivity of USN on Iwakuni, being told where to put LST;

)

SAC/LeMay (and Power, and others? See Butler) tries to keep operations and targeting away even from JCS, and Air Staff, let alone civilians (Congress! Kerrey inability to get targeting)

--CAN'T GET FORCES DOWN BELOW 1000 WITHOUT CHANGING GUIDANCE, I.E., GOALS, MISSIONS: SPECIFICALLY, D-L, PREVAILING, COVERAGE OF RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE WEAPONS: AND COMMAND AND CONTROL

1/29/17 9:56 AM I.e., so long as you demand coverage of Russian hardened silos, ports, etc.—and especially C3 bunkers and in cities—you have a DM (actually, if executed: not only a capability that could be used against cities, but a capability that IS used against cities, only not “per se”—cities, world population, as collateral damage. You can dismantle a DM only if you forego counterforce/damage-limiting against a superpower. (UK, France, CHINA never aspired to this; nor did SU under Khrushchev, until Brezhnev, after C-II. (A cost of displacing K—along with JFK—and “winning” Missile Crisis!

The “moral” issues of what we were doing always were elided, abstracted from, obscured, thrust aside, because we were only doing it defensively, as a precaution, a deterrent to having it done to us (EXCEPT? In case of “defending” against/deterring a possible SU attack on West Europe: as if Stalin lusted after West Europe the way Hitler did, or the way that Stalin lusted after East Europe (pursuing Hitler; and then, defending against a future Hitler).

Germans were doing it (actually not, though they could have); SU ICBMs (not); (real K threats—bluffs—on Berlin)—which we could counter only by strengthening our trigger of troops in West Germany (against UK preference: keep a “shaved trigger,” hair-trigger, like Ike);

[see how we “defended” our “deterrent” against a SU ABM system around...Moscow! Jesus! Added 60-100 MM to Moscow to get through, despite our own pen aids. (von Hippel; Postol?) compare Putin reaction to BMD sites in Poland and Romania!

From 1950 on (67 years) we have lived in a world where we did not monopolize nuclear weapons; I was 18 in 1949; you have to be my age, or a year or two younger (Roth, two years) (Gorbachev, same) to remember a world where the SU did not have nucs. Thus, "it's not only us." (And no one lost sleep over fact that we alone wielded a nuclear threat, under any circumstances! "No one should have nucs." Like, "no one should have a DM." (Neither superpower should try to be able to disarm the other in a first-strike, or even to "reduce damage"! (Can't be done below "acceptable" level, if that is defined in prewar terms: one to ten (!) cities, 20-30 (!) cities;

BRING IN MCGEORGE BUNDY AND YORK: "FOR DETERRENCE (I), ONE TO TEN TO ONE HUNDRED, AND CLOSER TO ONE THAN ONE HUNDRED." (WHEN THIS: IN "HOW MANY WILL DIE?"

GARTHOFF IN 1961-62 (=END OF CW)

HISTORY OF DECAPITATION—FROM LATE FORTIES—(AS IF TOKYO! MENTION! GROVES WANTS TO HIT TOKYO, NO?

(Intent is everything, as in WWII: "We don't (eat people): we don't kill people with intent, deliberately, we don't aim at them (though SAC did just that):

LEMAY TO COHEN: WAR IS KILLING PEOPLE

LEMAY TO SHRIEVER: ONE BOMB FOR RUSSIA.
(THAT'S EVERYONE IN RUSSIA: EXTERMINATION.)

(BUT: FALLOUT; ALSO, IN 1956, TN WEAPONS NOT ONLY IN EAST EUROPE AND EAST GERMANY, BUT EAST BERLIN (NOT THE CITY, JUST THE SUBURBS; WITH FIRESTORM (POSTOL) (WE DON'T BURN WEST BERLINERS; FIRE ONLY NORTH OF SUNSET)

MADMAN THEORY (MY LECTURES; ACTUAL US PRACTICE, FROM 1945 (WHEN WE COULDN'T STOP OCCUPATION OF EUROPE) THROUGH 1949 (BOTH US AND SU NUCS ON EUROPE) THROUGH 1964 (SU NUCS ON US IN SECOND STRIKE)

[still to put in: MAD, other plans, coercion, prevailing, decap.]
ENTHOVEN CHART, OF CITY DESTRUCTION IN 1964; JFK TO NESC, 1963;
KAHN: TRAGIC BUT DISTINGUISHABLE STATES

MCNAMARA TO ME IN 1961 (BOOK)

To TR just now: 1/29/17 10:35 AM:

For LeMay/USAF (Norstad), war becomes burning cities. A-bomb: efficient for that: one bomb, one city. But that threatens mainly an enemy country (until you “chase troops” that are invading your friends: Harold Brown, in exercise!).

Super: a bomb of unlimited power, perhaps Doomsday (probably not: could one bomb, 1000 gigatons (Teller) create enough smoke (fallout?) to do that? Not enough fuel, many cities. But could it be like an asteroid, spreading earth dust around globe, like 65 million years ago?)

But no one WANTS a DM; they get it just by accident, ignorance of effect, trying to decapitate and destroy reconstruction capability for industry, disarm enemy, etc. (lower their own damage, and achieve “victory” by having larger reserves at end (which I virtually encouraged them to believe: “don’t disarm yourself.” Did I say, “have larger forces”? Why is that of importance if enemy doesn’t have targets to threaten, and command and control to be coerced and to control its own forces?)

“You” might want a DM if it was cheaper, more attainable, quickly. Well, it is: the **Samson Option**, which triggers the DMs of the US and Russia! France (threat); (not really, UK—they always promised coordination, though they would hit Moscow, and would “defend themselves” against threats); ISRAEL (vs. Russia); South Africa (vs. Russia); (North Korea, if they get capability against the US! Iran, conceivably (“non-deterrable fanatics”); Saddam Hussein, threatening Tel Aviv (but not US)

And the DMs of US and Russia are really, themselves, SAMSON OPTIONS! (which pretend to be in interests of disarming the other—like David! He had only a real counterforce weapon, usable against ONE big opponent, not opposing army! Other had to agree to a one-on-one duel! (Like Horatious at the Bridge; Spartans at Thermopylae: both defending a narrow pass. Hole in the Wall gang. With Horatious, was the approach to the bridge narrow? Or did Horatious and two others (really) defend ON the bridge (while others were hacking away at it), so only one to three could get at them?) Lone Ranger: I didn’t hurt you, I only shot the gun out of your hand! (every week; with a silver bullet; never killed anyone.) (NOT High Noon). (Just looked at Crazy, by William Beatty, memories of radio shows of a guy four years older than me, 82 in 2010)

So as Szilard said in 1950, a DM could be used to coerce, “If you don’t...” but better as deterrent, as DM were and are really used: HK imagined it used to compel, or deter minor things, as Churchill did, for A-bomb: “If you don’t, well then...(Get out of East Europe; open yourself up to inspection, i.e., open regime, regime change in Russia; let go of SVN...hasn’t worked. But...” “don’t start anything” (you can’t finish, alive). So far it has deterred armed conflict between US and Russians, or any NATO allies and Russians (though Hillary was promising it, in Syria!

[Ask Gar: Was it aimed at East Europe at all? If so—a total failure? Or was it aimed from the beginning at a divided Germany, armed, under our control? Really, from 1945? A-bomb? Or did that sink in a little later, not as a motive for the Bomb but as a growing realization after Hiroshima?] (and Kai)

our entire arsenal, without cooperation from the Russians (as I postulated as a possibility in 1961—ha ha) (“What do you do if you do carry out your NATO commitment?” a) what I proposed: with NO good effect whatever (even if JCS conceivably followed it); b) **total withholding, then and now the only rational “use” of our weapons. (Which I didn’t consider, and would never have dared to propose if I had.) (Do I say this in the book, or not? That there is no rational nuclear response to an (irrational) nuclear attack. We must work to eliminate threats and preparations for any such attacks on either side, for superpowers, and for other NWS as well (even short of, or before, total elimination and ban of second-strike weapons). STOP MADMAN THREATS (WHICH IS ALL THERE ARE, IN THE NUCLEAR ERA. EVEN AGAINST NNWS, THE PRECEDENT AND ARMS RACE EFFECTS...)**

1/29/17 12:43 PM: I’ve wanted to “show, not tell.” But I may have to settle (for what I haven’t done so far) for “telling, not showing.” Describing, briefly; drawing morals.

Back to 1-24-17:

--Bring out: madness of decapitation; how terminate war? How limit it? EMPEROR (“If SU goes FS, it will still want to coordinate follow-on strikes, like us: say what?”) Preempt against C3: they can’t coordinate strikes (but look at us, if DC hit; or even, Omaha) (as if WWII)
 “But that’s what will deter them” (Carter?) (Maybe something to that, if it were needed)

IT’S THE ONLY PATH TO POSSIBLE VICTORY, SURVIVAL IN STYLE
 EVERYONE WANTS TO GET A HIT ON MOSCOW (INCLUDING FRENCH, UK: THEY ALONE INVALIDATE NON-DECAPITATION)
 THE HEART OF WAR-FIGHTING IS TO WITHHOLD AGAINST MOSCOW: except for USAF vision: prolonged war, hunter-killer (and our cities have survived?!)
 (Terminator) (THE MACHINES IN TERMINATOR, OR TRANSFORMER MOVIES, DON’T CARE ABOUT AN ENVIRONMENT HABITABLE BY HUMANS, COMFORT, FEELINGS, SECURITY: AIR, WATER, TEMPERATURE, FOOD (FUEL? NUCLEAR?))
 (REAGAN: PROLONGED WAR: ODOM)

along with madness of:

interference;

hitting cities in first wave (I couldn't believe it was seriously a FS plan: PACOM, JSCP, SIOP); Ike asks about this (McG B);
hitting China

disregard for allies, neutrals (fallout: even though, in theory, constraints near borders; no cities in satellites; except air defenses?)

stand-off ALCMs to preserve pilots (Perry!)

delegations

no reserves

"general war" =armed conflict with SU

[Ike was not wrong about limited nuclear war with Soviets; and perhaps even, big conventional war with Soviets (at least, Soviets possibly going first, if they were losing (how would that be?): still, how could US FU be "rational"?
(McG on Acheson on JFK: better would be "surrender," accept defeat near Berlin—or elsewhere! DON'T GO FIRST! (As Mcnamara warned LBJ and JFK: contrary to his/my speeches)

Madness: "Limited nuclear option, demonstration shot (

BUT: McNamara didn't press for or achieve (so I didn't achieve):

LST out of Japan

Change in delegation

No-cities

No-decapitation

(reserves, yes; principle of central control...

China off (until 1968? Later?)

Great (or any?) reduction in casualties: SU, East Europe, NATO, neutrals (aside from nuc winter)

PALs on SAC, Polaris

DEFINE: FU, FS, Extended deterrence, Type I, Type II, preemption, preventive war, counterforce, counter-value/cities/urban-industrial/population (1956, 1959...);
damage-limitation;

Reasons for my low rate of accomplishment:

--**Infeasible** (counter-force damage-limitation; kept WWK approach, but..)

City/military separation (esp. given JCS view of "military targets," including C3, air defense; and really "military industry," transportation...);

--**Service/SAC intransigence** (decapitation; China? ; PALs on SAC or Polaris;

My questions, concerns about GEOP, JSCP, SIOP:

Including

--Can they really mean these to be first-strike plans, or preemption/escalation, with cities as targets? (SEE CITY-BOMBING CHAPTER)(WWII, LEMAY)

--Likewise, hitting C3, Moscow?

--I thought of my plan as second-strike (despite damage-limiting); war terminating, not winning. But with recognition of US superiority, military saw it as a better FS plan; later, projecting it on SU (1978-81, CPD, earlier Team B/Pipes) as a war-winning strategy for SU—or US: good rationale for new weapons. So to extent my plan was influential, it had a malignant influence. (Sloss? Odom?) BUT: they all omitted key to it, no-decapitation!

--My desire/hope: to eliminate, or minimize, attacks on cities. (E.g., Polaris in initial waves: though SAC wanted them to hit air defense (cities!). Emphasis need for "reserves," i.e., Polaris withheld. (REAL OPTIMUM NUC POLICY: NO FS, NFU, TOTAL WITHHOLDING!)

--**My desire to get PALs on SAC and Polaris.**

--My desire to spare China (100M or more!) with no aggression from China (or, annihilation even in war with China)

[NOT to make FS or FU threats vs. SU, on Berlin!

But JFK implied that; likewise, McNamara (even though Athens/Ann Arbor were really aimed at France! And—Djohnstone—to move away from FU in Europe.)

QUOTE: McN to me; and advice to JFK and LBJ (and fear of "impeachment"; and basis for my fealty to him). I saw JCS as mad dogs, rabid dogs; only McNamara could subdue them (as he helped LBJ do on Vietnam, on bombing and troops) (though neither of us went into expose/resist mode, with public; both of us not only participated but actually advanced war-fighting agenda, while opposed to it (as I was on bombing VN). INSIDER APPROACH; secrecy. Congress looked "hopeless" (and, no doubt, was: although if public had been educated, maybe...!) (JFK didn't educate them—or even educate LBJ!—but neither did I.)

---After all: put in Herman Kahn: color, personal; Type I, Type II. (Deliberate ambiguity by everyone else, confusion, mystification). Domsday Machine! FS adherence; "not incredible first strike capability." Auschwitz jokes! Intellectually arrogant: as we all were! (Secrecy; our concerns, vs. military and condescendence it?) (My lecture on Hacha?)

On Hitler! NOTE: **MADMAN THEORY** was never used, yet, as Hitler would have, for expansion: only to maintain hegemony, sphere. Both sides. But our "deterrent" threats, BOTH Type I and Type II

CHECK: hst leaves 1000 warheads (too many!); Ike leaves 16,000! JFK/LBJ: over 31,000 by 1967 (peak) (Goldwater: "unilateral disarmament"! MT)

There should not have been *any* JFK buildup (unless some Polaris SLBMs; NO tactical weapons (see fatal leak in 1961: Richardson?) I was part of that; and RAND! (MM; keep large bomber fleet...)
(AJW still pressing case, based on SU buildup after 1964: get figures; CHARTS?)

See New Yorker, Lepore: HK on "tragic but distinguishable states." CHART

50 M dead vs. 150 M; FS with CD or without;

1/29/17 3:12 PM

Must insert into discussion of new NIE 1961:

p. 21

¹ [This could be on the web, but I think it deserves place in an end-note in the book, since the formerly Top Secret version of the NIE is now publicly available.]

In my memory since then, I've always recalled that the estimate I read was that they had "less than an IOC" (an "initial operating capability," meaning ten missiles), and that in fact it had mentioned the figure "*four*." But in reviewing the actual document, which has since been declassified, I find that it was less specific, and mentioned "10 to 25." Evidently my memory was based on what I was told that week by other officials who had higher clearances (and which was confirmed in a later NIE, in February), the real number was four SS-6's, their first, and that year only, operational ICBMs.

[see my change in missile gap chapter, p. 21)

p. 3, My Cuban crisis: "did the Russians know of our delegation..." In Dr. Strangelove chapter?

In Ann Arbor: The French/UK targeting of Moscow precluded my coercive/AnnArbor strategy; it wasn't just "inconsistent" or inconvenient; it

wiped out the whole concept. And we weren't about to get them to change their targeting. Or SAC's, for that matter.

Ann Arbor: Are we leaving out mention of my work on the SIOP-63/JSCP and Rostow's BNSP? OK—but then, no mention.

French/UK bombing of Moscow:

My Cuba: not that “tens of millions” –though unacceptable—was not worse than 150 million: but to accept a higher risk (“more than three in a million”) of the first at the cost of avoiding the second was not a good bargain, an ethical gamble, sane...

City Bombing:

p. 28: they wanted to believe (cut out) that they could differentiate between civilian targets and military, specific objectives.

JUST LIKE NO-CITIES, FOR BRODIE, RAND, LEGHORN, ME, WWK, PARRISH, RICHARDSON... (OR CONTROL, OR LIMITING GENERAL WAR; IKE WAS RIGHT ABOUT THIS—BUT HIS ANSWER WAS TO DOUBLE DOWN ON “DETERRENCE”, LIKE UK AND DE GAULLE).

AREA BOMBING VS. “PRECISE” BOMBING, “PRECISE DETERRENCE”

LIMITED CENTRAL WAR

End of City bombing: show (Herken?) early war plans. Rise in numbers: from 0 or 1 (big secret) to...

On H-bomb: following on a.i.

1946: scientists say: better to lose war than win with Supers

1/27/17 12:28 PM

McG B notes file?

David Rosenberg